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INTRODUCTION
This article presents the new, (re)forming elements of 
economic policy coordination, an instrument playing a 
central role in the European Union (EU). One important 
lesson drawn from the crisis is that in order for the EU to 
become a stable, dynamically growing economy – in 
addition to its internal market (in particular, the free 
movement of capital) and a single monetary policy – there is 
a need for efficient coordination, which should be credible 
for the markets as well. Economic policy coordination – the 
alignment of national fiscal policies to one another and, for 
euro area Member States, to the common monetary policy 
– is a key issue, and the intention to reform it is closely 
related to the crisis management of the past two years. In 
our analysis, the proposals are presented within a broader 
economic context with a retrospective view of the 
extraordinary policy measures taken as a response to the 
global financial crisis. The primary purpose of this article is 
to provide information about the still ongoing thinking 
process that is taking place in European institutions and 
major Member States.
The structure of this article is as follows: first, we provide a 
brief overview of the extraordinary policy measures taken 
s i n c e  a u t u m n  2 0 0 8  a n d ,  s u b s e q u e n t l y ,  w e  p r o c e e d  t o  
address the second wave of the crisis in the EU and describe 
the proposed new elements of the coordination directly in 
relation to the intensification of sovereign risks.
REASONS FOR THE FISCAL AND 
MONETARY EASING
In the autumn of 2008 the repercussions of the global 
financial crisis were spreading rapidly to the real economy. 
Striving to reinforce the stability of the global financial 
system, governments and central banks around the globe 
implemented extraordinary measures and adopted fiscal 
and monetary easing to counter the deepening recession. It 
was clear from the start of crisis management that recovery 
from the global crisis hinged upon the concerted action of 
major economies and, in recognition of this necessity, the 
negotiations of the G20, which comprises the world’s largest 
economies, assumed an increasingly important role and 
introduced the most important crisis management measures. 
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Decision-makers were also aware that the extraordinary 
measures they adopted could only be effective if the fiscal 
easing did not prompt markets to call into question the 
sustainability and the long-term equilibrium of the 
economies.
The fiscal easing, which was rather pronounced across the 
European Union, took place within the framework of the 
EERP (European Economy Recovery Plan). It is difficult to 
present exact figures, but by 2009 the consolidated ESA-
based EU budget deficit – which also includes the deficit 
increasing effects of the automatic stabilisers in times of 
recession – increased to 6.9 percent from the 2.8 percent 
observed in the previous year, while the increase in the debt 
ratio between 2007 and 2010 amounted to around 20 
percentage points.1 According to the ECB’s estimates (ECB 
2010a), the fiscal packages provided under the EERP in the 
euro area amounted to 2 percent of GDP over a two-year 
period (2009–2010).
It should be noted at this point that this significant fiscal 
easing alone gave rise to considerable tensions as regards 
compliance with the provisions of the Stability and Growth 
P a c t  ( S G P ) .  O f  t h e  2 7  M e m b e r  S t a t e s  2 5  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  
currently subject to the so-called excessive deficit procedure 
(EDP). This means that, with deficit ratios in excess of 3 
percent of GDP, none of the EU Member States meets the 
budget deficit criterion except Sweden and Estonia.
Following the acute phase of crisis management, decision-
makers shifted their focus to exit strategies, i.e. the reversal 
of extraordinary measures. The announcement of the exit 
strategy did not mean in itself that its implementation 
started immediately; it was merely intended to demonstrate 
to the markets the manner in which economic policy would 
return to normal functioning. A good illustration of a timely 
announcement of the exit strategy is the European Central 
Bank (ECB): as early as September 2009, in a much 
anticipated speech President Trichet provided a detailed 
overview of the ECB’s exit strategy, stressing the ECB’s 
commitment to price stability and the temporary nature of 
the crisis management measures. Nevertheless, the gradual 
re-absorption of monetary liquidity began only at a later 
phase, and the ECB’s key interest rate stands at a record low, 
1 percent, even as of September 2010.
Fiscal consolidation is perhaps an even more pressing issue. 
W e  m i g h t  s t a t e  i n  g e n e r a l ,  t h a t  f i s c a l  e a s i n g  i s  o n l y  a n  
option if it does not call into question the sustainability of 
public finances. Even if such is the case, it will not have a 
noticeable stimulating effect if the private sector immediately 
starts offsetting it by increasing its savings in anticipation of 
a future fiscal tightening (Ricardian equivalence).2 At the 
time the crisis management plan was adopted most signs 
indicated that the fiscal policy had accumulated sufficient 
credibility for the fiscal stimulus to generate a short-term 
effect. However, it was clear that the fiscal policies of 
individual Member States had to start addressing the issue 
of consolidation as well, and finding an answer, as soon as 
possible, to two questions: at what levels individual Member 
States intended to stabilise their debt ratios, and where they 
would find the funds for the consolidation that was required 
to achieve that target.
INTENSIFICATION OF SOVEREIGN RISKS, 
THE SECOND WAVE OF THE CRISIS
The first results of the fiscal stimulus were very positive: the 
EU economy demonstrated a quarter-on-quarter growth 
from as early as the middle of 2009 and, amid gradually 
restored confidence in the capital markets, credit spreads 
began to decline markedly. For the EU, however, new 
tensions started to simmer under the surface. While the G20 
negotiations were sufficient at the global level, as regards 
the EU – in particular, the euro area – the attempt to align 
fiscal policies to the regulatory framework imposed by the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) failed to produce convincing 
results. Indeed, following the overheated period of the 
preceding years, the depth of the recession faced by certain 
Member States was so astounding that – given the lack of 
firm fiscal measures – it raised increasing concerns about 
the sustainability of public debt.
While the sustainability of the debt trajectory is crucial for 
each country; in the case of the euro area two additional 
aspects should be considered in its assessment. On the one 
hand, even though the deep economic recession might 
warrant further monetary easing in a specific country, 
under the single monetary policy it is impossible to adjust 
monetary conditions to address the problems of a single 
Member State. On the other hand, as the single currency 
implies joint fiscal responsibility, leaders of the euro area 
c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  n o n e  o f  t h e  M e m b e r  S t a t e s  s h o u l d  b e  
allowed to go bankrupt; nonetheless, the moral hazard 
arising from the European aid also need(ed) to be addressed. 
Indeed, the SNA clearly declares that neither the European 
institutions nor the ECB can rescue individual Member 
States (no bail out).
1   In addition to high deficit levels, the stimulus packages provided by the government to the financial sector during the crisis largely contributed to the increase in the 
debt ratio. 
2  In fact, the arising of the Ricardian equivalence is somewhat more complicated than that: with sufficiently heterogeneous economic participants, fiscal stimulus could 
easily have a material short-term effect.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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A frequent form of “assistance” applied at the national level 
in previous decades was the direct provision of central bank 
financing to the government, in other words, turning on the 
money presses. Obviously, this did not solve any problems 
over the long run and merely induced inflation, but over the 
short run it was a convenient solution for governments. 
Contemporary central bank acts provide for the prohibition 
of monetary financing precisely to prevent this kind of 
practice at the institutional level. In the case of the EU, this 
specifically means that the ECB and the other central banks 
are not allowed to extend loans to public institutions, and 
c a n n o t  p u r c h a s e  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  s e c u r i t i e s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
Member States directly in the primary market.3
In early 2010 – during the intensification of the Greek crisis 
– decision-makers of the Union were tied up for months 
with debates over the moral hazard associated with 
European assistance and rescue.
It was not until May 2010 that a clear and resolute response 
was agreed upon, when several crisis management measures 
had to be adopted at an extraordinary weekend meeting 
prompted by the renewed escalation of market tensions. As a 
result, the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers 
(Ecofin), in cooperation with the IMF, decided to set up a 
massive (EUR 440 billion) common euro area fund (European 
Financial Stability Facility, EFSF),4 which can be used by 
distr esse d  e ur o  ar ea  M e m be r  S ta t es  if  finan cin g  th e mse l v es 
from the market is no longer possible. Loans granted by the 
fund are guaranteed by euro area Member States. In each case, 
when a Member State indicates that it seeks this assistance, the 
Member States jointly extending the loan must make a separate 
decision in line with their own national regulations.
Simultaneously, the ECB also passed a number of important 
decisions: it announced that, with a view to restoring the 
normal functioning of the monetary transmission 
mechanism, it would begin to purchase government 
securities in the secondary market (Securities Market 
Programme, SMP). It also introduced additional liquidity 
providing instruments. In addition, Member States 
expressed a firm commitment to pursuing a sound fiscal 
policy and, to this end, decided to reform the fundamentals 
of economic policy coordination.
Before providing an economic assessment of the individual 
items in the proposals, it is worth looking at the prevailing 
rules and their practical weaknesses.
THE EXISTING SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC 
POLICY COORDINATION
As the official title of the euro area, the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), aptly indicates the – currently – 16 
Member States5 not only constitute a monetary union, but 
they are also expected to coordinate their national economic 
policies, in general, and their fiscal policies, in particular. 
From the perspective of economics the explanation is rather 
simple: a common monetary policy can only accomplish its 
primary mission – price stability – if it is supported by a 
sound fiscal policy. In practice, the rules are set out by the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).6 The regulation has two 
particularly vulnerable aspects. On the one hand, it must be 
ensured that each Member State pursues a sound fiscal 
policy and that new Member States are not allowed to 
become a “free rider” to benefit from the stability of the 
euro area as a whole. On the other hand, the rules should 
define unambiguously what “sound fiscal policy” means and 
how to impose it on Member States. The SGP does not apply 
to euro area members only; the rules it sets forth must be 
observed by all EU Member States. However, there is an 
important difference: the assessment of the fiscal 
convergence criteria during the accession process focuses on 
two specific figures: public debt cannot exceed 60 percent 
of GDP,7 and the general government deficit must be below 
3 percent of GDP. There is another difference, which is 
r e l e v an t  t o  H un gary  as  w e ll :  in  th e  case  o f  E U  M e m be r  
States outside of the euro area, a breach of fiscal rules has 
not resulted in any material sanctions thus far. Although the 
applicable rules of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) 
empower the EU to suspend payments from the Cohesion 
Fund to any Member State if the Member State concerned 
persistently fails to act upon the recommendations aimed at 
reducing the deficit, this has never been applied in practice.
At the time the rules were formulated, no-one expected that a 
sev ere crisis such as that observ ed in the first half of 20 1 0 
would unfold barely 10 years after the euro had been adopted. 
At the beginning of the year, “only” a few Member States were 
3   Moreover, the ECB will not conduct interventions even in the secondary market of government securities unless these are necessitated by disturbances in the 
monetary transmission mechanism.
4   In addition to the EFSF, they also established a so-called European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), which can grant a loan or credit facility guaranteed by the 
EU up to EUR 60 billion, available to any EU Member State. (In addition to the two funds mentioned above, the so-called Balance of Payments assistance remains 
available to Member States not participating in the euro, the ceiling of which is currently EUR 50 billion).
5   With the accession of Estonia, the euro area will consist of 17 Member States by 2011.
6   Bences and Kutasi (2010) provide a current and detailed overview of the relevant rules.
7   In case of a public debt level higher than 60 percent, a sufficiently diminishing debt ratio will suffice. This is the reason why Belgium and Italy were able to meet the 
fiscal criteria upon the adoption of the euro despite a debt ratio exceeding 100 percent of GDP.MNB BULLETIN • OCTOBER 2010 43
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subject to scrutiny in relation to their fiscal sustainability, as 
evidenced by the evolution of the CDS spreads, the measure of 
sovereign risk. Undoubtedly, during this period Greece was at 
the epicentre of the crisis. Greek risk premia soared to nearly 
1000 basis points – a level never before seen in the EU. Market 
p a r t i c i p a n t s  w e r e  n o  l o n g e r  c o n v i n c e d  t h a t  G r e e c e  c o u l d  
recover from the crisis on its own, and yet negotiations on a 
plan for international assistance progressed very slowly. As 
discussed above, owing to concerns about the moral hazard 
associated with potential EU assistance and the no bailout 
clause of the SGP, the decision-makers of the Union waited 
very long to reach a decision on the aid to be offered to Greece 
jointly with the IMF.
The Greek situation, however, had become a pan-European 
issue not only on account of its precedential value, but also 
because of the increasing threat of contagion of the crisis. 
By May market participants had began to lose confidence in 
the entire euro area. They had no way of knowing what 
resources and mechanisms were available to the euro area as 
a whole to support distressed Member States. Markets were 
extremely worried about a possible domino-effect induced 
b y  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  d e f a u l t i n g  o f  v u l n e r a b l e  c o u n t r i e s ,  a s  i t  
would have imposed too great a burden on the entire euro 
area for even the more stable countries to finance. On the 
one hand, these fears were reflected by the substantial 
weakening of the euro, on the other hand, they contributed 
to the disturbances in the government securities market and 
t o  th e  ris in g  ris k  p r e mi a  e v e n  f o r  o s t e ns i b l y  m o r e  s tab l e  
Member States.
In autumn 2010, all these facts clearly indicate that the 
European institutional system was unable to ensure fiscal 
discipline either in the euro area or in the broader EU, and 
that the European mechanism was not functioning smoothly 
during the process of crisis management. The crisis made 
decision-makers realise that the rules needed to be revised 
significantly, and that the future of the euro could not be 
secured without a serious reform. The specific proposals are 
presented below.
PROPOSALS AIMED AT THE REFORM OF 
ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION
As regards proposals for the future, we should look back to 
March 2010. In the spring, during the intensification of the 
Greek crisis it was already clear that the longer-term 
problems of the European economy had to be addressed at 
the EU level. Accordingly, the European Council (EC), 
which comprises heads of state and government, announced 
its new strategy – known as Europe 2020 – for the creation 
of jobs and the promotion of growth. The main elements of 
the strategy are aimed at increasing employment, improving 
the conditions for education and R&D, increasing energy 
efficiency, reducing the emission of greenhouse gases and 
combating poverty. In addition, the Council decided to set 
up a Task Force (TF) headed by the President of the EC, 
Herman Van Rompuy, in which the finance ministers of the 
Member States and representatives of the ECB and the 
European Commission work together to develop an efficient 
crisis management framework and a series of measures 
required for greater fiscal discipline. The TF will present its 
final report and proposals during the October 2010 meeting 
of the European Council. Before looking at the details, we 
should note that, in parallel to – but institutionally 
independent of – the work undertaken by the TF, other, 
equally relevant reforms are being developed with a view to 
reinforcing financial stability (e.g. laying down the Basel III 
Directive, setting up the European Systemic Risk Board).
PROPOSALS OF THE VAN ROMPUY TASK 
FORCE (TF)
The first meeting of the Van Rompuy Task Force was held 
shortly after the turbulence in early May. At the start of the 
work process, participants agreed on four major objectives:
1.   Enforce greater fiscal discipline; strengthen the rules of 
the SGP
2.   Establish macroeconomic surveillance, similar to fiscal 
surveillance, as part of the process, reduce divergences in 
competitiveness between the Member States
3.   Set up an efficient crisis management mechanism
4.   Strengthen broader economic governance in institutional 
terms
At its second meeting, the TF provided further details on 
the first two issues, budget surveillance and macroeconomic 
surveillance. Within this framework, they intended to revise 
several points of the Stability and Growth Pact to ensure 
tha t  M e m be r  S ta t es  in  b r ea c h  o f  th e  fiscal  rul es  ma y  be  
sanctioned at an earlier stage and in a more gradual way. 
Specific proposals relevant to this issue are as follows:
•   Adoption of the so-called “European Semester” as of 
2011. Practically covering the first half of each calendar 
year, Member States would coordinate with the European 
Commission in respect of the main assumptions underlying 
their budgetary plans for the following year. Since this 
coordination would be concluded prior to the budgetary 
d e b a t e s  o f  e a c h  M e m b e r  S t a t e ,  n a t i o n a l  p a r l i a m e n t s  
would be able to make a decision in consideration of its 
results.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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•   Extend the early sanctions of the SGP, for example in cases 
where the level of debt rises too quickly even before the 3 
percent deficit threshold is breached. Figuratively speaking, 
similar to traffic lights, you would now get a ticket not only 
for running a red light, but also for running a yellow light. 
At the same time, the TF stressed that the specific rules and 
sanctions would have to be defined precisely.
•   The level and sustainability of public debt should play a 
bigger role in budget surveillance, especially for countries 
with a sharply rising debt ratio.
•   There is a need to guarantee the independence of national 
statistical offices (by keeping data provision free from 
p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e s )  a n d  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  M e m b e r  S t a t e s  
report sufficient and reliable statistical data.
As regards macroeconomic surveillance, one important 
conclusion drawn by the TF from the experiences of the 
crisis was that sound budgetary policies were necessary, but 
not sufficient to ensure the competitiveness of the economy. 
This may give rise to problems particularly for members of 
the euro area, where devaluation with a view to improving 
competitiveness is no longer an option. Accordingly, the TF 
proposed the application of indicators to monitor 
competitiveness and imbalances (scoreboard), and asked the 
European Commission to work out the specific details in 
that regard.
Based on the initial sub-report of the TF, the EC approved 
the main approaches and set a deadline – October 2010 – 
for the submission of the final report.
PROPOSALS OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION
By the end of June 2010, the European Commission had 
prepared its proposal presenting in detail the specific steps8 
outlined below.
In relation to macroeconomic surveillance, the European 
Commission proposed a two-stage approach.
In the first stage (prevention), the Commission would assess 
the external and internal imbalances of each Member State 
on the basis of an overall indicator system (scoreboard). 
Based on the emphatically non-mechanical assessment, the 
Council may issue country-specific proposals, which may 
include policy recommendations addressing a broad range 
of issues covering macroeconomic policies, labour markets 
as well as goods markets or macro-prudential matters. In 
particularly serious cases, the Commission may recommend 
placing a Member State in an excessive imbalances position 
(similarly to the excessive deficit procedure).
The purpose of the second stage (correction) is to enforce 
compliance with the recommendations issued in relation to 
the specific case. The excessive imbalances position 
mechanism would apply to all EU Member States (in 
practice, it is expected to function in a manner similar to 
the excessive deficit procedure; in other words, the Council 
would issue recommendations to the affected Member 
State, the implementation of which would be regularly 
monitored). However, non-compliance with the 
recommendations would result in more stringent sanctions 
for euro area Member States, as in their case imbalances 
might jeopardise the entire euro area.
In the area of fiscal surveillance, first and foremost, the 
C o m m i s s i o n  e m p h a s i s e s  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  h i g h  q u a l i t y ,  
independent statistics, and proposes that Member States 
develop national fiscal rules and multi-annual budgetary 
planning. The Commission dedicates a separate chapter to 
the significance of sustainable debt. In this context, as a 
preventive measure, the Commission would introduce 
stricter criteria for highly indebted countries in respect of 
th e  d e fi ci t.  In  thi s  fr am e w o r k,  M e m b e r  S ta t es  wi th  d e b t  
ratios in excess of 60 percent of GDP could become subject 
to the excessive deficit procedure if the decline in debt falls 
short of the satisfactory pace of debt reduction. As regards 
corrective measures and the abrogation of the excessive 
deficit procedure, the Commission recommends the 
adoption of a simple and clear rule: with a debt ratio 
exceeding 60 percent of GDP, bringing the deficit below 3 
percent of GDP would not be sufficient for lifting the 
excessive deficit procedure if the additional criterion of a 
declining debt ratio is not satisfied at the same time.
The Commission intends to take account of several 
additional parameters in the assessment of a sustainable 
debt level, such as the maturity structure and currency 
denomination of public debt, state guarantees, and implicit 
liabilities (e.g. future costs related to the ageing of society).
The Commission addresses the issue of future sanctions in 
great detail. It states, in general, that the breaching of rules 
could not be prevented in the past, and so sanctions need to 
be much more rule-based and applied on a case-by-case 
basis; in other words, a wider range of sanctions should be 
introduced. Another principle is to ensure that sanctions 
kick in at a much earlier stage, and it is necessary in their 
application to seek effectiveness and equal treatment 
8 Before this document was prepared, the Commission had drawn up a similar material in early May; however, it was not ordered by the Van Rompuy Task Force.MNB BULLETIN • OCTOBER 2010 45
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between Member States. To ensure proportionality, financial 
sanctions would be defined as a percentage of the GDP of 
the relevant Member State (up to an identical upper limit for 
all Member States).
In the preventive stage – when a Member State is not making 
sufficient progress towards its medium-term budgetary 
objective – they would impose an interest-bearing deposit 
on euro area Member States and, applicable to all Member 
States, cohesion support would be disbursed pending on the 
implementation of structural and institutional reforms.
As regards the corrective stage – when the specific country 
is subject to an excessive deficit procedure – the Commission 
proposes a new system of financial sanctions. In essence, 
this would deploy the EU budget to enforce compliance with 
the rules set forth in the SGP. Sanctions should not affect 
items directly transferred to individual beneficiaries, but 
rather payment to Member States. On this basis, cohesion 
support or payments under the Common Agricultural Policy 
could be suspended or cancelled altogether. 
Finally, the document provides technical details relating to 
the “European Semester” in light of its forthcoming 
adoption in 2011.
ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS
Several governments and institutions have commented on 
and added further proposals to the work undertaken by the 
TF. Since the opinions offered by different countries are 
generally not public and they are discussed within the Task 
Force (at the sherpa level), and since the work of the TF has 
not yet been concluded, we present below only two, high-
profile proposals: that of the ECB and the joint position of 
the French and the German government.
The Governing Council of the ECB released its own position 
on 10 June 2010 (ECB, 2010b). It set out proposals – in 
particular for the euro area – in three areas: strengthening 
surveillance over budgetary positions; an improved framework 
for competitiveness surveillance with a more efficient 
management of imbalances; and finally, establishment of a 
viable crisis management mechanism. According to the ECB, a 
quantum leap forward is needed in order to sufficiently 
reinforce the institutional foundations of the euro area. Among 
the details, two new items should be highlighted: in an attempt 
to tighten fiscal rules, the ECB would establish an independent, 
E U - l e v e l  f i s c a l  a g e n c y  a n d  p r o p o s e  t h a t  t h e  s u s p e n s i o n  o f  
voting rights be included in the spectrum of sanctions.
The joint German-French statement was issued on 21 July 
2010, following the third meeting of the TF. As an introduction, 
they confirm their commitment to making the institutional 
framework of the economic policy more efficient, and they 
also agree on the three most important areas: revision of the 
preventive and corrective rules and setting up a crisis 
management mechanism. It is an important element of the 
joint position that they propose extremely stringent sanctions 
for Member States breaching the rules of the SGP: in addition 
to the suspension of payments from the Cohesion Fund – 
pending an appropriate legal basis – they also propose, 
similarly to the ECB, a suspension of voting rights for Member 
States that repeatedly fail to comply with the rules.
There is consensus about the need to have in place a crisis 
management framework that guarantees to minimise moral 
hazard. This can be achieved by ensuring from the outset 
Date Institution Main proposals and novelties
26 March 2010 European Council (EC) EU 2020 programme, setting up the Van Rompuy Task Force
10 May 2010 Ecofin A common European rescue package and a firm commitment to sound fiscal policy
21 May 2010 Van Rompuy Task Force Identifies the 4 main areas to be reformed: fiscal discipline; competitiveness surveillance; 
crisis management mechanism; more efficient coordination
7 June 2010 Van Rompuy Task Force Presents detailed proposals relating to budgetary and macroeconomic balance
10 June 2010 ECB Urges very resolute measures; independent fiscal agency, tough sanctions
17 June 2010 European Council (EC) Supports the approaches of the TF theretofore; commitment to improved coordination
30  June  2010 European  Commission Presents specific proposals about several issues (e.g. European Semester, sanctions, 
macroeconomic imbalances)
12 July 2010 Van Rompuy Task Force Focuses on the sustainability of debt; works out the stages of macroeconomic surveillance 
21 July 2010 Joint proposal issued by the 
French-German governments
Strict sanctions against Member States in breach of the rules
6 September 2010 Van Rompuy  Task Force Presents budget surveillance and macroeconomic surveillance; a detailed overview of 
sanctions
Table 1
  Chronological order of the specific proposalsMAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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that receiving assistance from the Union is tied to the 
fulfilment of stringent conditions. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that, despite months of work, the markets do not have 
confidence in an efficient future crisis management. This is 
confirmed by the fact that, by mid-September, the risk 
premia of several euro area Member States reached or 
approached the levels observed in early May.
Table 1 provides a chronological summary of the proposals 
discussed above.
While the purpose of this article was to present, 
predominantly from an economic perspective, the proposals 
being forged, we should also stress the special role of legal 
considerations. There was a conscious effort to formulate all 
presented proposals in such a way, that their adoption 
would merely require the revision of secondary legislation   
without a need to revise the Treaty. Therefore, only the 
proposals not contradicting the provisions of the Treaty 
stand a real chance to become enacted regulations.
We should also touch upon equal treatment, a heavily 
discussed issue in the EU. On the one hand, in working out the 
proposals, several specific references have been made to this 
principle; e.g., when the Commission expressed its intention to 
set up a GDP-proportionate upper limit for the sanctions. On 
the other hand, as regards equal treatment, the logic applied by 
economics helps to avoid a situation where an apple has to be 
compared to a pear. On occasion of the previous reform of the 
SGP, Gábor Orbán and György Szapáry (2004) drew attention 
to the economic considerations concerning equal treatment: 
“In many documents and declarations reference is made to the 
‘equal treatment’ of members when talking about the uniform 
application of the provisions of the SGP. Equal treatment in an 
economic sense would mean that one differentiates according 
to initial conditions and future liabilities...”. Indeed, in an 
economic sense, equal treatment would only prevail if a more 
indebted country would have to pursue a tighter fiscal policy 
than countries with a more favourable initial position and 
lower debt level.
CONCLUSIONS
In summing up the presented proposals, we should emphasise 
that the European Council will only make a final decision 
O c t o b e r ;  a t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  w e  o n l y  t a l k  a b o u t  d r a f t s .  
Nevertheless, the main directions of the changes can 
already be foreseen with a reasonable certainty.
Decision-makers are determined to adopt economic policy 
coordination mechanisms far more efficient than the 
existing ones. Accordingly, they will rigorously assess both 
fiscal and real economic imbalances, and after the 
imbalances have been identified, they will waste no time 
enforcing corrective mechanisms, including sanctions more 
severe than those in place. Rules governing crisis management 
w i l l  b e  c e r t a i n l y  c l e a r e r ;  h o w e v e r ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  m i n i m i s e  
moral hazard, the common European rescue package will 
continue to come with a large price tag.
It is a warning sign, however, that despite firm policy 
intention, markets remain rather sceptical about the reform 
of the fiscal framework and the ability to guarantee the 
sustainability of fiscal policies, as indicated by the sovereign 
credit risk premia, which by September rose to the levels 
observed in May.
REFERENCES
BENCES, I. AND G. KUTASI (2010): “A Gazdasági és Monetáris 
U n i ó  f i s k á l i s  s z a b á l y r e n d s z e r e  –  v á l s á g  e l ő t t  é s  u t á n ”  
(“Fiscal rules of the Economic and Monetary Union – before 
and after the crisis”), Európai Tükör No. 2010/7-8.
E C B  ( 2 0 1 0 a ) :  “ T h e  E f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  E u r o  A r e a  F i s c a l  
Policies”, ECB Monthly Bulletin, July 2010.
ECB (2010b): Reinforcing economic governance in the euro 
area. 
EUROPEAN C OMMISSION (2010): Communication from the 
Commission: Enhancing economic policy coordination for 
stability, growth and jobs – Tools for stronger EU economic 
governance, 30 June 2010.
ORBÁN, G. AND G Y. SZAPÁRY (2004): “The Stability and 
Growth Pact from the Perspective of New Member States”, 
MNB Working Papers, 2004/4.
TRICHET, J. C. (2009): The Exit Strategy of the ECB, speech 
at the ECB Watchers Conference Frankfurt, 4 September 
2009.
VAN ROMPUY, H. (2010): Remarks following the first meeting 
of the Task Force on economic governance, 21 May 2010.
VAN R OMPUY, H. (2010): Remarks following the second 
meeting of the Task Force on economic governance, 7 June 
2010.
VAN ROMPUY, H. (2010): Communiqué following the meeting 
of the Task Force on economic governance, 12 July 2010.
VAN ROMPUY, H. (2010): Remarks following the meeting of 
the Task Force on economic governance, 6 September 2010.